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In The Human Condition (1959), which is mentioned as her opus magnum, Arendt gives a political 
ontology applying a phenomenological method; she blends the chronological explanation with a 
conceptual analysis. The axis of thought train is the private-public distinction put in a historical 
framework. The feminist authors warn us, that this distinction is not a neutral analytical instrument 
but an abstraction deduced from the reality of the antique patriarchal society. At the same time, 
Arendt, in other feminist interpretations is a forerunner of feminism who, in her biography written 
on Rahel Varnhagen, a Jewish woman of Berlin in the first half of the 19th century, created a role 
model of modern woman who dared to risk of entering the light of the public realm that had 
previously been dominated by males and, in her Berlin saloon, offered an alternative space where 
the women were peers of men. The pro-Arendt feminist interpreters assert, the Arendtian philosophy 
outlines the possibility for a no male-dominated, really democratic public realm.     
The political philosophy of Hannah Arendt has been flavored by a history of decline. The beginning 
of the modernity, in this interpretation, is the moment of derailment. During the centuries of 
modernity, step by step, the division lines between private and public spheres disappear. Lasting 
institutions, warranting the public sphere, dissolve in the never-ending procession of material 
production: everything becomes fluid: culture and politics change into the objects of the ever-
widening cycles of consumption devouring whole reality and the intimacy, conquering and 
distorting the emptied public realm, creates proper constellation for totalitarian political practices.        
  




The distinction between private and public spaces has been a basic tenet of political thought 
since the beginning of modernity. In public space, individuals strive for gaining the respect of 
others. Private space is a field of particular human needs that must be excluded from public space. Is 
this distinction tenable in our age? Our era, this is frequently said, is un-interpretable with the 
classical binary notions of modernity (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p.151). The requirement of a well 
trenched public space with its lasting institutions, from the perspective of late or post-modernity, 
seems to be irrelevant. Many thinkers assert that the elimination of borders and the hybridization of 
life spheres are the main characteristics of our age. Zygmunt Baumann has coined the term of liquid 
modernity by which he refers to the overall dissolution of borders, institutions and solid, lasting 
identities (Baumann, 2000, pp.7–8). 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCHES AND STUDIES                                                  No 8, 2018 
 213 
At the same time, this duality is the precondition of a healthy and well-balanced economy 
of human existence. Public and private spaces as autonomous, distinct, well-fenced ontological 
terrains are, in the interpretation of Hannah Arendt, in a complementary relation: they exclude and 
postulate each other at the same time. Without protected private space, the depth of human existence 
flattens and becomes shallow. Human beings need a home, a shelter for keeping their physical and 
psychical health and integrity (Arendt, 1958, p.71.) At the same time, it is true as well that, without 
protected public space, human existence remains one-sided and truncated. 
 
Spatial essentialism and cultural criticism: the theatre as a model for public space 
     
The health of public life depends on the strict separation of private and public realms – it is 
the core of the Arendtian approach. Both terrains of human existence have to be strictly separated 
from each other and entrenched within the borders of their territories – this spatial essentialism 
gives the basic framework of the Arendtian political philosophy. Without this separation a well-
functioning political democracy is impossible, Arendt warns us, and many thinkers, following her 
argumentation, trace back the crisis symptoms of contemporary democracy to the elimination of a 
distinct public space. This is the basic tenet of the Arendt disciple Richard Sennett who develops his 
own theory within an Arendtian theoretical framework. 
German Existenz-philosophy, through Jaspers and Heidegger, and the experience of Nazi 
totalitarianism had undoubtedly deeply influenced the thought of Arendt (Canovan, 1992; Young-
Bruehl, 1982). Politics conceived in the Arendtian philosophy in a definitely non-Weberian 
meaning; it is not a striving for power but a res publica, a common business of every citizen rooted 
in the human plurality; human beings live in a common world constituted and maintained by human 
action, which cannot be accomplished without human togetherness. The phenomenological 
approach is one of the most important elements of her intellectual toolbox inherited from her 
masters. The phenomenological description of the shared human world is the main aim of the 
Arendtian political phenomenology. Human existence is communal existence. The human being, 
according to Existenz-philosophy, has been thrown into the world but he/she exists together with 
others in this world. Arendt describes the ontological situation of human beings from two different 
perspectives; a pessimistic cultural criticism and an optimistic political philosophy. Cultural 
criticism is part and parcel of her German heritage of the inter-war period; it is gloomy theory 
describing modernity as an era of decay: human history is a history of decline (Verfallsgeschichte). 
Arendt borrowed motifs mainly from her master Martin Heidegger whose existential 
ontology seriously influenced her approach (see Zimmerman, 1990, for the Heideggerian cultural 
criticism). In The Human Condition, she gives a political ontology outlined by the help of 
phenomenological method; she blends chronological explanation with conceptual analysis. The axis 
of thought train is the private-public distinction embedded in a historical framework. The beginning 
of the modernity is a moment of derailment; the division line between private and public spheres 
disappears and a new hybrid realm emerges: it is the sphere of social (see Pitkin, 1998, for the 
detailed analysis of social). The lasting institutions, warranties of a well-functioning public sphere, 
dissolve in a never-ending procession of material production: everything becomes fluid and an 
object of the ever-widening cycles of consumption devouring whole reality. The elimination of 
public realm, because of the fatal constellations of the interwar period, creates proper constellation 
for the totalitarian political practices of the 20th century (Arendt, 1976). 
This interpretation of the history of modernity is very similar to the theory of cultural 
industry explained in the common book of Adorno and Horkheimer, The dialectics of modernity. 
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Modernity, in the peculiar Arendtian interpretation, is an age of re-naturalization taking place at the 
expense of the field of human artefacts from culture to politics (Kovács, 2012). 
Her opus magnum, The Human Condition (1958) is dominated by a decline-narrative while 
in next book The revolution (1964) she changes her perspective; here modernity is not an age of 
total sinfulness anymore because modern revolutions give hope for gaining authentic political 
experience and recovering authentic public space (Arendt, 1990). Arendt uses the Greek polis model 
in which public and private space are rigorously divided from each other; the former is constituted 
by the polis-citizens on the agora. Liberty and equality – which are artefacts and not natural innate 
qualities of human beings in the Arendtian interpretation – appear in the light of public space: they 
are embodied in human actions and human speeches. But these are male actions and male speeches 
– women, similarly to the servants, are prohibited from the agora. Private realm, on the contrary, is a 
female terrain; it is the sphere of inequality and hierarchical relations. 
 
Arendt and the feminist perspective: Rahel Varnhagen and a 19th-century attempt for the 
foundation of a feminine public space.  
  
The Arendtian private-public distinction, the feminist authors warn us, is not a neutral 
analytical instrument but an abstraction deduced from the reality of the antique patriarchal society 
based on male domination (Pitkin, 1994).  The Greek polis had been established on the institutions 
of slavery and the household. The latter was a scene of unequal social relations between men and 
women. The household gave protection to the patriarchal family in which women and children were 
subdued to the despotic male rule. The price of political liberty enjoyed by the men on the agora, on 
the stage of politics, was paid by women.  However, without some kind of subjugation, it is one of 
the basic tenets of Arendtian political philosophy, liberty cannot exist at all: you must deliberate 
yourself from the burden of biological necessity including of producing foodstuff, ensuring shelter 
and bearing children – in the antiquity these activities were the tasks of slaves and women; the price 
of liberty, in premodern world, was paid by other human beings. The burden of biological necessity, 
in modern times, can be shifted upon machines. At the same time, this burden always remains a 
necessary part of human life. It can be fenced within a closed territory; household, family, factory 
etc. but it can’t be eliminated at all. Arendt’s deepest conviction is that liberty needs a closed 
territory exempted from necessity. Human equality is not natural; it is a fragile human artefact 
maintained by the political community. 
Feminist interpretations of Arendt are ambivalent; it is the reflection of the ambivalence of 
her oeuvre.  Arendtian political philosophy, as a consequence of her ‘Grecophily’, can really be 
interpreted as a macho theory: the privilege of free action in the public realm, in the space of 
appearance, is reserved for male agents. Arendt, her feminist critics assert, perpetuates the Greek 
polis model and her idealized public-political actors are typical male characters: their try to prove 
their own excellences, similarly to the Greek heroes of the Iliad, by ostentatious acts and speeches. 
They try avidly to get the admiration of the outer world concealing and overcompensating their 
inner uncertainty and vulnerability by glittering rhetoric and spectacular deeds (Pitkin, 1994). 
This interpretation of the Arendtian political ontology is one sided but it is not without 
cause. The Arendtian theory for action is undeniably burdened with ambivalences (d’Entreves, 
1994, pp.64-100). Arendt refers to two kinds of action without making a definite distinction between 
them. What is the target of the feminist critique is the agonistic-expressive action; it has been 
associated by Arendt with Greek polis. The male actor, acting this way, presents his excellence in an 
egoistic manner to the detriment of his fellow humans. At the same time, communicative action, 
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contrary to the expressive type, takes place in the situations of plurality when the peers are really 
equal and the field of action hasn’t been distorted by the conditions of subordination. 
But there is another side of the coin. Seyla Benhabib, one of the pro-Arendt feminist 
authors, interprets Arendt as a forerunner of feminism who, in her biography written on Rahel 
Varnhagen, the Jewish woman of Berlin in the first half of the 19th century, created a role model of 
modern woman daring to risk of entering the light of the public realm that had previously been 
dominated by males and, in her Berlin saloon, offered an alternative space where the women were 
peers of men (Benhabib, 1996, pp.20-21). 
Arendt, in this early book, examining the life-situation of her heroine, connects the problem 
of Jewish and female identities. The historical context is Prussia, more precisely Berlin at the turn of 
18–19th centuries, during the period of the French occupation and in the consequent decades. Arendt 
gives a parallel analysis of different Jewish life strategies among the conditions of the Prussian 
nation-building in a transitional period between the mixed society of the late 18th century and the 
homogenized society of the 19th-century nation-state. The referential framework is a toolbox 
inherited from German Existenz-philosophy. The book is a Bildung-Roman, an educational novel 
describing the attempt of constructing an alternative public space in a Berlin saloon where a Jewish 
woman, playing the role of a mediator between the Prussian bourgeoisie and the Prussian 
aristocracy, tries to construct for herself an identity by the way of assimilation into the Christian 
society of the emerging modern Prussian nation-state. Rahel Varnhagen goes over the accustomed 
way of assimilation of the early 19th century: she converts from Jewish religion to Christianity and 
gets married to a Christian man, trying, Arendt concludes, to become a paradigmatic parvenu, but, at 
the end of her life, she has to realize that this life-strategy requires a total and perpetual self-
surrender from her (Arendt, 1997, p.256). 
The attempts of Rahel Varnhagen fail as well on the level of public realm: her saloon of 
Berlin proves to be a temporary phenomenon. The cause of it is an inherent paradox built in the 
dynamic of modernity. At the time of the emerging of 19th century Prussian nation state Jewish 
political emancipation invests Jews with political rights but, at the same time, gives rise to modern 
political Anti–Semitism. With the decline of the idea of a mixed society inherited from the 
Enlightenment the Jew ceases to be the representative of an interesting, exciting specimen of the 
foreigner and becomes a suspicious figure in the homogenizing atmosphere of the nation-state; the 
inclusivist type of alien-construction rooted in the ideas of Enlightenment is replaced by a new 19th 
century exclusivist-type conception and the temporary broker-role of Rahel Varnhagen as a Jewish 
woman loses its ground (Arendt, 1997, p.127). At the same time, the figure of Rahel Warnhagen is 
important, the pro-Arendt feminist interpreters assert, because this proves that the Arendtian 
political philosophy anticipates the possibility for a no male-dominated, really democratic public 
realm, so the Arendtian theory is able to give referential points for feminism as well.   
 
The age of intimacy and the end of public realm 
 
The end-result of the process of dissolution taking place in an accelerating way during the 
centuries of modernity, in the Arendtian interpretation, is the age of intimacy and the end of public 
realm. Arendt (1990, p.104) distinguishes three stages of this process: the 18th century is the era of 
high society, in the 19th century emerges the genteel society and in the 20th century takes place the 
mass society, a precondition of modern totalitarianisms. The motor of these transformations is the 
swelling of the terrain of intimacy. The members of high society constitute a thin stratum, the 
aristocrats, genteel society embraces a much wider segment of the population, the bourgeoisie, mass 
society comprehends every member of the collectivity. The irresistible expansion of the intimacy 
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contributes in a great amount to the dissolution of lasting institutions. The totalitarian regimes of the 
20th centuries with their amorphous structures eliminating both public and private realms emerge 
from this constellation. 
Naked private personality without a protecting shield, Arendt warns, corrodes and, in the 
long run, destroys public sphere, a terrain of human interaction based on the plurality of human 
beings.  That is why, Arendt argues, in Greek tragedy actors hid their faces beyond masks to insulate 
the natural man from the artificially constructed public man: 
 
“The profound meaningfulness inherent in the many political metaphors derived from the 
theatre is perhaps best illustrated by the history of the Latin word persona. In its original 
meaning, it signified the mask ancient actors used to wear in a play. (…) The mask as such 
obviously had two functions: it had to hide, or rather to replace, the actor's own face and 
countenance, but in a way that would make it possible for the voice to sound through.  (…) 
the word persona became a metaphor and was carried from the language of the theatre into 
legal terminology. The distinction between a private individual in Rome and a Roman 
citizen was that the latter had a persona, a legal personality, as we would say (…) Without 
his persona, there would be an individual without rights and duties, perhaps a 'natural man' 
– that is, a human being or homo in the original meaning of the word, indicating someone 
outside the range of the law and the body politic of the citizens, as for instance a slave – 
but certainly a politically irrelevant being”  (Arendt, 1990, pp.106–107). 
 
This theatre-metaphoric, in the theory of Arendt-disciple Richard Sennett, plays a central 
role. Sennett gives an interpretation of modernity between 18th and 20th centuries in which he uses 
the referential frame of the Arendtian thought. He focuses upon the transformations of the structure 
of public and private realms during these centuries. The apex, according to Sennett, was the 18th 
century with a flourishing public life. It was an age when the autonomy of public space and its 
intactness from the intrusion of private sphere were maintained by some kind of impersonality. It 
had been ensured by distinctive marks; dresses, gestures, behavioral patterns promoting social 
interactions among foreigners who came from the different segments of society. Men were 
considered to be actors both on the stage of theaters and on the streets of the emerging modern 
metropolises as Paris and London. Shared human acts in this model are distanced from the private 
contents of human personality; the actors of the theatre and the persons on the streets of the city 
wore fictive mask-like characters concealing their personal feeling and emotions; this artificial 
distance-making impersonality was the most important presupposition to present a common 
theatrical play and to conduct shared social and political action (Sennett, 1977, pp.107–122). 
The 19th century proved a turning point in the history of modernity; naked human 
personality intruded into the public realm. It was a prelude to the intimate society of our age and 
introduced a new kind of political domination in which the politician brings the people under his/her 
sway by the presentation of his/her private feelings and emotions; what counts it is not his/her 
program or the schedule of the political acts he/she wants to realize but what he/she is like. His/her 
electoral success hinges on whether he/she is able to present himself/herself as an authentic 
personality. That kind of political manipulation involves the emergence of a collective personality, 
using the phrase of Sennett, a destructive gemeinschaft in a dead public space. In the ages of a 
vigorous, flourishing public realm collective identity has been shaped by collective action while in 
the ages of inflated private space without public realm collective identity has been shaped by 
fantasies and projection. The doer has been replaced by the passive voyeur, a collective personality 
motivated by fear and hate:  
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“Just as personality itself has become an antisocial idea, collective personality becomes 
group identity in society hostile to, difficult to translate into, group activity. Community 
has become a phenomenon of collective being rather than collective action, save in one 
way. The only transaction for the group to engage in is that of purification, of rejection and 
chastisement of those who are not “like” the others. (…) The logic of collective personality 
is the purge (…) Broadly stated, when people today seek to have full and open emotional 
relations with each other, they succeed only in wounding each other. This is the logical 
consequence of the destructive gemeinschaft which arose when personality made its 
appearance in society” (Sennett, 1977, p.223). 
 
Conclusion   
 
The ‘destructive gemeinschaft’ arises in the late 19th century. The Dreyfus affair analyzed in 
a detailed way by both Arendt and Sennett is a historical prefiguration of the 20th-century 
constellation leading to totalitarian regimes. Albeit totalitarianism suffered defeat, Arendt warns, 
without the healthy balance of mutually protected private and public realms, among the conditions 
distorted by the dominance of privacy, destructive gemeinschaft with its xenophobe exclusivist logic 
appears again and again. The post-democracy of late modernity (Crouch, 2004) can easily be a 
hotbed of new kinds of totalitarianism. 
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